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INDICATIONS INTELLIGENCE

Member 50X1*Working Sub-Committee on
Indications for IAC.*

The business of Indications Intelligence is primarily a rather highly specialized form of current intelligence. It began its life over in the current intelligence shop here in CIA. It flourishes in a constant flow of information and it has very little time for anything like research in depth or even, in most cases, thinking in depth. We do our thinking first. We set up a matrix or an outline plan and then we usually scan everything that comes across our desks for evidence to fit it. In a sense this is preconditioned intelligence and it is prone to all the errors of preconceptions. At the same time, however, we have masters that can force upon us a certain objectivity and realism. It keeps us pretty well cleaned out. The business is fairly old by intelligence standards. Not many things in intelligence go back more than 6 or 7 years, in their present manner of practice. We go back to the summer of '48 when the perilous state of CIA and of American Intelligence in general made it unpleasantly clear to us that, in the case of the Berlin Blockade, we had no idea whether the aircraft that were arriving in fields around Berlin represented the Soviet intention to interfere with the airlift to the extent of shooting down our aircraft and thereby running a very grave risk at war, or whether they were merely a routine replacement of the aircraft normally stationed in the area. We discovered that we knew very little about the level of Soviet military preparations, the extent to which they had backtracked since the level of readiness that they maintained at the end of the war, and we were astonished to discover that no real integrated plan existed for pulling that information together in one place. Out of the series of panic-struck questions

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which were addressed to various collectors in the field by the military intelligence agencies and by ourselves, and out of a little bit of deep thinking and plagiarism from some brief studies, we pulled together an indications list, a check list. A check list is the core and heart and guts of the indications business. It is a list of those activities which we expect to see the Soviets, the Communists, undertake prior to going to war. Implicit in this definition are a number of things. One of them, that the Soviets at any one time are not prepared to go to war. It implies, likewise, that the Soviets, reasonable in many respects in their own self interest, would take certain measures to place themselves in a state of readiness before they take off. They will not start off unprepared if they plan to win a war. It likewise implies—and this is our greatest, most ticklish operating assumption—that somehow, someplace, somewhere, evidence that these activities are being undertaken by the Soviets and members of the Communist party will come to the attention of the far-flung outposts of US and [redacted] These are pretty big assumptions. Much remains to transform them into fact. But they are reasonable assumptions at present and we think we can operate in them. By indicators, thus, we postulate in categories largely functional the degrees of mobilization, steps toward mobilization and war readiness which a given level of Soviet existence, lack of preparedness, requires for maximum war readiness. Now these indicators are drawn from what appears to be reasonably necessary in our current intelligence appreciations of what the Soviets are doing or are about in their day by day operations. If the Soviets, for example, in the instance of state loans, have, as they did shortly after Joe's death, reduced the requirement on the individual

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citizen by one half—the Soviets set into existence a bunch of purchasing power which in preparation for war and in the consequent concurrent shortages of material goods, the Soviets will have to siphon off in some way or another—it is reasonable to assume that in one form or another the bite on the floating consumer purchasing power will be made. Therefore, for the purposes of our indicator list, one element in Soviet military preparation is the raising of the state loan or the adoption of other measures which exist and can be identified for the siphoning off of consumer purchasing power. By a backtracking process, which starts from a point of the amount of consumer goods floating around in the market on which these consumer purchasing power rubles can be spent, you can estimate, roughly, about where in the mobilization process it is necessary to impose these measures. Our current estimate is that they would probably have to be doing it at about D-90 days. Certainly, in some of the areas where the rural population can keep the purchasing power situation loosed up with a good healthy free market, they may have to impose it a little earlier. Therefore, if we see this imposition of the purchasing power restrictions concurrently with a number of other items, we can arrive at some sort of conclusion that the Russians are up to something that they didn't have to be up to prior to some decision taken at some prior date. An indicator by itself, and there are hundreds of them literally, is not particularly useful alone. They can give you a misleading impression. If you hang all your hats on one hook, that hook is not adequate to give you a judgment of color. A number of these things will appear concurrently. The pattern of their occurrence, the rate at which they follow one another in the position, in adoption, in implementation will give you something of an idea of the rate of preparation. Backtracked from it will

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almost give you the date at which the decision was made to undertake preparedness measures. It does not, however, provide for the difficult situation where the Soviets, judging from what they think we are up to, may be taking purely defensive preparation, putting themselves on a war footing not with an intention to aggress but to be fully and adequately prepared to meet any aggression on our part. It raises, of course, as a collateral issue the interesting speculation as to how much the Soviets believe their own propaganda that the United States is definitely out for all the aggressive activities and intentions which we impute to the Soviets, on our side. The cumulative effect of reading the evidence and finding pieces of it in the daily current take which hang on one or another of these indicator hooks is the process of Indications Intelligence. As you can see, this is nothing much more than a highly specialized view of current intelligence, as I originally stated. The indicator lists which exist today are obsolete. Most of them were drawn up in the course of the panic of 1948; some of them have been modified to include lessons we learned from the Korean War, but to my knowledge none of them have yet made the adjustments required for the hydrogen age, tactical atomic bombs, and the various new capabilities available to the Soviets in this high performance of speed, jet aircraft bombers, long range submarines and ultimately we will have to adjust to the age of guided missiles. This business, therefore, is by no means a complete art. It is growing all the time and it needs revision all the time. It needs restudy, it needs rethinking. Many of the things which we, in 1948, justifiably felt were radical departures from the norm now become so much a part of routine Soviet activity that they must be dismissed as having any indications value and are really nothing more than the substance of daily life in the Soviet Bloc or among Soviet troops.

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Now, the revision of indicator lists is our present first task. We are embarking on it with a certain amount of humility and a great deal of difficulty.

The sensitization of an indicator depends primarily on the amount of knowledge of that facet of Soviet existence which can be marshaled to study the validity of it. For example, if we find that it is no longer reasonable to believe that Soviets must necessarily evacuate to the Polish-Russian or Rumanian-Russian border change points--rolling stock from East Germany and Hungary in order to provide for a resupply or second lift in behind the advancing forces--if this is no longer necessary because they now have springing axles that move back and forth between the gauges, that evacuation of railcars eastward is no longer of any indications value. By ourselves we are unable to determine whether or not these changeable axles exist. We see reports, we had a very interesting report the other day, of a citizen who, because he managed to sleep through the change-over at Brest-Litovsk, came to the unshakable conviction that the Soviets did now have these changeable axle cars. The job can be done and was done so often by the Soviets at these change points that the whole process need not arouse a good sleeper in the car--it's very smooth, it's very effortlessly done, but it is not done in such a way as to permit massive through passage of freight trains loaded with heavy ordnance items. They're doing it by cranes. They pick up the body of a passenger car, pick it right up like that, and sit it down on a new set of tracks. The cranes are operated with such smoothness and efficiency that the body of the passenger car is not even shaken in the transfer. This guy happened to doze and shortly found himself on his way into Poland. As far as he was concerned there had been a change of axle without any change in

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anything else. This shows you some of the difficulties we run into. These guys are not always accurate in their reporting. Now, since that is the case, since they assume that this is the case, that they don't need to make these changes, this indicator goes out the window. To put it out the window, and to save the amount of time that would be put into trying to collect information on whether or not these freight cars had been evacuated to the eastern borders, in order to get rid of it from our considerations, we need to be told by an intelligence analyst more or less specialized in transportation that this is now the case with respect to rail axles at the border change-points. We can't do it for ourselves; there are not very many of us and we have many other jobs to do besides following transportation intelligence in its minute details. Expand this example to include almost any other indicator that you might think of, and you find that our real function is nothing much more than a central coordinating exchange, where we go back to these people asking them if they have seen anything to justify the value of this indicator as being useful now, currently valuable, or whether they think because of technological advancement on the part of the Soviets, the indicator ought to be thrown out and the money spent trying to collect information on that should be spent in some other way.

This whole process of reevaluating indicators must continue, must be sharpened; we have to go into more and more of the indicators that had built-in time factors. Many items of preparation, for example, particularly in physical goods, have built-in life spans. They'll be good for six months, they'll be good for 30 days, they'll be good for a year, but no more. The ideal indicator in this context is one which reflects an activity so expensive in nature that

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it would not be undertaken for the purpose of conducting a successful military campaign. Likewise, it should be one which can be easily observed, either directly by observation in the Bloc, or by repercussions on life in general on a wide enough scale so that even though our observers are restricted in their movements, concussions and repercussions of this particular activity will be perceptible even in their isolation. Now, there are not very many of those, but there can be more and all it takes to do it is a little imagination and a great deal of knowledge. If we believe, for example, that even a Soviet surprise attack must be preceded by urban evacuation and measures for industrial rehabilitation in the Soviet orbit, it does not require very much imagination to know that these measures, because of the number of people involved and the amount of materials involved, will take a certain amount of time to implement. It is not very taxing on the imagination, likewise, to estimate that it will take a longer period of time than the flight time from an advanced base to a US target. This is a golden indicator. This one is well worth having around and it needs a great deal more work on it. But, this a sample of the ideal. I cannot believe that the Soviet ministers-- many of them whom are engineers now, who have come up through the ranks, and who have a passionate love for their machinery and their industrial plant which we in this business can very dimly perceive--that these men would knowingly jeopardize the safety of this equipment, plant, and the industrial powers which it represents for post war operations by failing to take this measure of protection, of rehabilitation. Rehabilitation of vital industry in part means duplicate installations elsewhere, manned half-time or on a stand-by custodial basis which imposes a load on heavy machinery building enterprises, and also

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may require temporary structures, many of which will be visible from the rails that our observers can travel, some of which will be reflected in the amount of temporary type construction material that is required—plastic board, galvanized roofing, in quantities of an unusually large nature compared in given regions with what they normally consume. Canvas for the tents that the workers would live in; canned food, requiring as it does certain techniques of preparation, and cans. Canned food is not a normal commodity in the USSR in the volume that it is in the US; consequently, many cases of abnormal sequestration of canned goods will have an immediate impact on the civilian market, particularly if it's undertaken on a wide scale in a very short period of build-up time, as would have to be the case if it were to precede a sneak attack on the United States. Now, this involuted reasoning process is what needs to go on in all cases, for all indicators. What it involves is a continual postulation or a projection of a personality, of ourselves—into what the Soviets ought to have to do, and then reading from our many, many contacts of what they are doing and whether or not there is any juxtaposition, coincidence, parallel, or correspondence between what the Soviets are doing and what we through constant reresearch of these problems find that they should be doing in order to prepare for war. It's a transparently simple process. There is no magic about it, but it does require a group of people primarily oriented in this direction and with little else to do. In other words, an indications group of any sort needs to be sprung from the necessity of regurgitating the contents of State Department cables in a daily publication. The incredible amount of time and energy that goes into the grab, gobble and regurgitate process of current intelligence vitiates the concentration required

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for this kind of follow-up on Soviet activity. It follows from this that a wide separation from the responsibilities of current intelligence without any separation from the sources of current intelligence is a must for this operation. At long last we have achieved this remarkable Nirvana. We have an indications center established and we will probably be moving in this weekend, in the second basement of the Pentagon down near the Air Force Command Post. They gave me a railroad car, in effect, to work with—a space 20 ft. wide and 150 ft. long, which requires fantastic juggling in order to make it operate efficiently. We've got 20 people in all, 11 analysts drawn from the Army, Navy, Airforce, State and CIA. A lot of them senior people, a lot of them experienced in the racket, many of them with considerable military experience in intelligence during the last difficulties or Korean situation. Our responsibility is to grab as much information as we can from as many sources as we can. We have provided for us direct dissemination to us from all of the services, CIA and State, in all of the classifications and categories that are required for our job. We get the information semi-raw, semi-finished and finished, and we go over it bearing in mind as most of us now do almost automatically the kind of thing we are looking for in any given item of information that we pick up, and throwing aside much which is, from the current intelligence point of view, highly reportable, but which for our specialized purpose is just so darn much sand and dust or padding. Now, we exist as a support operation for an interagency Watch Committee which has existed in various forms for some time. The first one I set up back in the summer of '49 after a year of concentrated missionary work among the Philistines and got a pseudo, quasi, partial, semi-committee together. We did all right. And in late 1950, the job was turned over to G-2, which had another committee going paralleling ours and roughly feeding

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into ours at the time, but which had on it a number of colonels and brigadier generals giving the thing an awe of respectability which our informal situation did not permit. That committee continued in operation right up to August of '53; in fact, it continues today, roughly the same people. At that time, August of '53, in an order to improve themselves—which was salutary and highly commendable—the committee turned in a recommendation for the establishment of a supporting operation like the Indications Center. This was passed up to the IAC, who duly thought about it and appointed an ad-hoc committee to create one each indications center if it were possible. This was done after a period of a long, long, winter of much discussion over many points, many of which have been passed to me totally unsolved. This process led to the passage by the IAC in May of a DCIC 1/2, widely known as one-half, which put us into operation and gave us a charter of things to do. If you have gotten an impression from my discussion so far that we are in the indications business and in the intelligence business primarily, it can be illustrated through this charter that we have other things to do as well. The most interesting, tantalizing and highly controversial provision in our charter is that we are to develop and operate on the current continuing basis a Watch Committee intelligence plan for systematizing, energizing, and coordinating through appropriate channels the world-wide collection by US agencies of the information and intelligence that is pertinent to the Watch Committee mission. There is a great deal of hope, promise, and ultimate despair I suppose, in the word 'energizing', a rare and interesting word in the intelligence community, and one which doesn't usually find it's way through the stream of gobbledy-gook into a document with the official stature,

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DCID 1. How one goes about energizing a collection channel is yet to be discovered, but we are working on means. Its intent is laudable; the difficulties inherent in the lack of definition in this charge are the substance of the problems which we daily face. The purpose of it is obviously for us to be able, in ringing tones of command, to inform a collector in Warsaw that he better get off his chair and get out there and count the freight cars coming through from Brest-Litovsk on their way to Frankfurt on the Oder or get out and do something anyhow. To do so, however, requires passage through a number of established channels and many of them, from energizing attempts in the past, have developed a protective coating somewhat like a pearl, though less valuable, against such stimuli. This is too bad. I think we will have to adopt a principle of the corrosive effect of vinegar on pearls, ultimately, to bring about an accomplishment of this responsibility. We also are to arrange through the IAC, or the appropriate member thereof, for the exploitation of every domestic and foreign source of information and intelligence pertinent to the Watch Committee mission, and, among other actions, arrange an appropriate time for representative IAC field agencies to confer with us, and so on, in order effectively to coordinate but not direct (it says here) field intelligence activities. The contrast between what is intended in the second charge with what is required for the execution of the first provides us again one of these gloriously unsolved problems with which we must daily live. Nevertheless, we're getting along, we'll get there. Many of you are veterans of this organization, and know the intelligence community better than a first-come on basis; you know what it takes to arrange through the IAC or the appropriate member thereof the exploitation of every domestic and foreign source of information and intelligence pertinent to the Watch Committee

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mission. You can see in this a task of magnitude, particularly when you deal with such monolithic entities as G-2 and the requirements apparatus in CIA and such things as that which have a defensive language all their own, not susceptible of interpretation by those who venture in from the outside. We arrange with the IAC agency for a systematic screening of information and intelligence received by them by any means for the purpose of immediately extracting and forwarding all items which may contain indications of Soviet Communist intentions to commit hostile actions, and so on. Arranging with the IAC agencies for a systematic screening in essence boils down to going out beating the streets and collaring analysts everywhere and saying "If you see anything like this send it to us and remember it six months from now when you might see it." Our principal job follows right in this charge, and that is a constant irritant, an irritating liaison with those who are otherwise preoccupied that they shall remember, when the day comes to pass, a piece of dope which we desperately need on our remote underground dungeon. This inherently implies an act of faith on which the national salvation depends. That sounds rather grandiose, but it is ultimately the case. It imparts to the individual analyst a responsibility to get for us from that they see the word, which will fit in with all the other pieces we should at the same time be receiving from a number of other analysts. We will have a cumulative picture of Soviet war preparation from day to day, coming along so that we will be able to take this to the Watch Committee and say "Reverend Sirs, the situation is bleak," and they can in turn will put their stamp on it and pass it up to the IAC, and so on. I have long experienced with analysts, having been one myself, being one still in many cases, and I am aware that there many diversions on them. They are required to grab, gobble and regurgitate current intelligence, and because of the convolutions of

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editorial processes in the intelligence community today which have a regenerative process all their own, I know that the analyst is more preoccupied with the passage of his piece, on which he has lavished great professional care, and is less concerned with the recognition of the intelligence items and their passage to us. None-the-less it is our mission to keep him jassed up enough to send it along when he finds it, if he finds it, and as he finds it. This is not only for CIA, but it is also for every other organization from which we will draw our raw materials and intake. As I say there are eleven of us in the professional side of this indications center and I think it is quite clear from this that we've got quite a job right there. Now we do other things which are normally inescapable. The three that I've gone into here in detail are the challenging aspects of the job. That's the hard work. That's the essential to our success. If we can't do these things, then we haven't any business being around, drawing pay and being a repository of national confidence, in a manner of speaking. We also develop early evaluation, we coordinate, we prepare material for the use of the Watch Committee, we reproduce and disseminate approved Watch Committee reports, maintain files of indications, maintain raw maps and test the application of mechanical aids and techniques to the problem on an experimental basis. This is a recognition of the high level pressure for a pin-ball machine of some sort which will react with flashing lights and the chorus will start waving a banner at the appearance of armaments information. There's an incredible amount of pressure that we do this. I fortunately have been able to draw up my budget without any reference to a mechanical experimentation category. I don't know how long I'll be left in my innocence to continue that way. The indications center is just getting started. We have spent six

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of the most interesting and confused months that I think anyone could ever have in the intelligence business. We have built this thing from a directive up into a physical appliant, into personnel, into regulations, into everything. We've done everything that it took to originally build CIA. And if the CIA is ever demolished, I am available for rebuilding. I know how to do it. I've done it. I have an Air Force Officer who's a colonel, who thought he had seen everything in SAC, and whose confusion and perturbation is great these days since I have handed him many of the jobs I am unable to undertake myself. We run into opposition, over-ambitious help, encouragement, occasional contempt, and now and then the insolence of office. These are exceptable in the intelligence community; by and large the reaction has been extremely helpful. By and large the amount of energy and help that people are willing to give us is just unexpectedly great. Much will depend in the future on our timing in going back to these people for help. They want to use their help at this time. We hope that their hopes and energies and good will will continue to exist in the future when we will desperately need them. Now, we are an inter-agency organization engaged in current intelligence of one sort or another. We are a full-time shop with guys sitting there wearing various uniforms and various forms of civilian clothes. We represent a new thing. This is the only such thing. There are other inter-agency operations which are more of a coordinating body, a consultant body, advisory body, ad-hoc committee or something like that, but we are a working substantive organization on an inter-agency basis and as such our problems certainly reflect a new thing under the sun. This being the case we are repository for many collateral and occasionally irrelevant

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problems which people have sort of had in the back of their safes for many years waiting for an inter-agency substantive organization to come along and here it is let's give them this to work with. A lot of our time is spent in fending these off. In view of the nature of Soviet technological advancement recently and the horrifying appearance of a four-jet bomber last year, there is a great deal of pressure by those who feel the need for an alert mechanism of great reliability, high speed, accuracy, and perceptiveness hitherto unachieved. They have been trying to hang that albatross on me for some time. We profess and sincerely believe ourselves to be in the advanced warning basis and not the early warning basis. We consider ourselves to be different than those energetic people in the far north sitting in those round houses watching blips on screens. We do not believe that we have the capacity properly to seize upon the receipt of information - a flight of Soviet bombers are coming in over Alaska - and order the ADC into a general quarters. I blanch at the idea of my doing something like that. I'm not getting paid nearly enough for that kind of responsibility. Let them who are being paid carry it. I firmly believe that our position should be, when such a flight of bombers is spotted, "We told you so, you stupid jerks, and we told you six weeks ago that they'd be coming about now." Properly done advanced warning will do that, I think. If I didn't think so I wouldn't be in the business. But it is our firm conviction and it is supportable, I think, that the concurrent appearance of activities which are implacably required in Soviet military preparation and the knowledge of those responsibilities made available to us at the proper time will demonstrate to us a change in climate from that which we now live in and we will see that they are headed up towards something. At first, we will see this dully and our signs will be susceptible to many interpretations.

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One of the great pitfalls of life in the intelligence community as I have observed it in better than 14 years of experience in it now is the regrettable tendency of an analyst to believe that the most obvious explanation is the correct explanation for a given event. There is a very great tendency also among analysts who are tired, and many of them are, to avoid giving to a piece of evidence a flapworthy interpretation lest he would have to stay late or get up in the middle of the night and generally conduct himself like a dervish. I sympathize with this. But we, in a way, will take the same piece of current intelligence and we don't care about sleep, apparently, and we will go ahead and give it an ominous interpretation ourselves, hoping that we will see more ominous information progressively so that we'll all get decorations. The analysts, consequently, will not hold us in high regard or with any great love because I imagine we will probably call some of them out of the sack for their expert view. I look forward to the early hour that we shall do this just for kicks. But, I do believe that we can get this poop together since we are now free, as I have said, from current responsibilities to do this. I think the machinery exists now to do the job of advanced warning. We do not profess to be able to point with unerring accuracy at 1300 hours in the afternoon of 25 February 1956 as the date on which Soviet bombers will drop their first bombs. But we can, I think, point to a level of preparedness in the Soviet military machine of such an order of magnitude that there is little more they need to do at any given time to go to war, and that there is nothing more that we can see now which will give us any more warning than we already have. Our job of advanced warning would then be merely the notification of this state of affairs to the appropriate operational people, who,

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if they take it seriously, (and by God they better) will then order their forces into a general quarters alert, 24 hours a day, 7 days a week so that they will be ready and able to knock down anything that early warning says is coming. There is a very great and valuable thing done thereby. We have saved energy in not putting our forces on a 24 hour, 7 days a week alert when it isn't required, but we have insured that they will be in that alert condition when the circumstances of Soviet preparation indicate that they should be. There are among indicators those of a long range nature and those of a short range nature. Accumulative and sequential appearance of these should provide us a rough gauge of the pace and order of their proceedings, and when the intake consists entirely of evidence pertinent to last minute indicators we should duly reflect this fact and point to the fact that this is a last minute state of affairs. The degree of which we will be able to do this with accuracy, of course, goes into the business of refining our indicators. Among the short range indicators there are very short range indicators, and even in sneak attacks I think we will have adequate knowledge of them. We should be able to provide for a classic—we estimate, and this is really a rough estimate—we estimate that for a classic cross frontier combined arms military operation involving massive forces, in what people would regard as Armageddon, we can give a good notice six weeks or more in advance that such a situation impends, that the critical situation we fear is at hand. In the case of a sneak and surprise attack on us conducted solely by 50 Soviet bombers taking off from the Kola Peninsula in Chukotski, I think we can give 24 hours of warning. This is 18 hours more than the early warning could give, and therefore justifies a separation of this process from radar. 24 hours warning is enough time to get the aircraft gassed up and the boys get their

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last cup of coffee down before they take off. If intelligence can do this and bring about in that 24 hours appropriate urban evacuation of the United States, that walk-out into the fall-out that people talk about, we can, I think, save some lives, a number of lives and a good deal of real estate. I can't think of what more we would ever be asked to do and I would prefer to be sure that we can do this than that we can accurately evaluate blips on radar screens that would turn out embarrassingly to be massive flights of wild geese bound South. I've been hauled out of bed for that flock of geese I don't know how many times. We had a very amusing one one time when a guy up in Labrador got, I guess Labrador and Newfoundland got one of these concentrated blips on the screen and we scrambled aircraft from Westover north to Newfoundland to pick off the incoming flight of Soviet bombers and these geese got a going-over they'll long remember. I'd rather see them jump for geese than not jump at all and have them bombers.

But, that's the situation. We're willing to get up and come in even for geese.

Now, let me give you a hypothetical short story, called the down-count. This has appeared in other forms as NIE 11-8. At D minus 6 months, this is based on a hypothetical detection of an oncoming major war, combined arms, big show. The main form of our indicators will fall in the economic mobilization category. This category by its very nature takes longest to accomplish. It must be initiated first. We should see how the organization of certain governmental machinery provide for that tight centralized control the Soviets dearly love and have in the past required. Many of the committees which they organized in 1941 to conduct the war against the Germans have been in the years past abolished. They need to be reorganized and reconstituted.

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Shadow committees of that order exist but they are not signing orders.

Appearance in the press of orders signed by the Committee for Control of

Food Resources under the Council of Ministers will be the appearance of the

kind of committee which we will look for. Here, this committee's job will

involve control of many people and much material. They will begin to be

appearing in the Soviet Broadcasts and the Soviet press. An alert analyst

in OHR suitably indoctrinated will, I trust, pick up this thing and send it

along. This does not mean that we then mark a date six months from then on

the calendar and say D-Day. We will probably have to have many of these things

before we will believe our very eyes. And we will probably have to have many

more of these things before we can convince our bosses that this is going on.

So about D minus 4 months we should be catching up with the realities re-

presented by events perceived at D minus 6 months. But if we catch up with

that recognition from D minus 4 on, we should really be on the ball. Changes

in economic planned targets, progressive reductions of consumer purchasing

power, I give you that. This is only a partial list, a very partial list.

Decreasing availability resulting in increased attention to economy in certain

commodities. In the use of chemical fertilizer for example, fertilizers are

a major preoccupation in the Soviet Union, at least in the FBIS. They don't,

I believe, have enough capacity for manufacturing these things, commercial

fertilizers, and gun powder and explosives too. Explosives have a definite

deterioration rate. In order to acquire enough explosives on hand at the

opening of hostilities, they will have to take something away from the

chemical fertilizer business until the chemical fertilizer business in the

next few years develops a capacity for both guns and butter. We would check

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